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Article 1

THE TENTH
ABRAHAM L. POMERANTZ
PROGRAM
Wall Street in Turmoil: Who Is
Protecting the Investor?
IntroductionNorman S. Poser'
This issue contains the proceedings of the Tenth Annual
Abraham L. Pomerantz Program, a Symposium held at
Brooklyn Law School on February 6, 2004. I began the
Symposium by stating a premise: the purpose of federal and
state securities regulation is to protect investors. When we look
at the conduct of investment bankers, research analysts, stock
exchange specialists, or mutual fund advisers, it cannot be
denied that the regulatory system has failed to do its job. Again
and again, investors have been betrayed by the professionals in
whom they placed their trust.
This regulatory failure is largely a result of the failure
to deal effectively with conflicts of interest. Most bankers and
brokers wear several hats, and one of these hats is their own
self-interest.1 The distinguished regulators, attorneys and
academics who participated in the Symposium have provided
answers to two questions: first, how should our legal and
© 2004 Norman S. Poser. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. Harvard College, LL.B.
Harvard Law School.
1 See Norman S. Poser, Conflicts of Interest within Securities Firms, 16
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 111-15 (1990) (describing the conflicting interests created by
multiple roles of industry personnel).
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regulatory systems deal with these conflicts of interest; and,
second, what role should the states play in regulating the
securities markets?
Conflicts of interest in the securities industry did not
arise just yesterday. It would be wise to heed George
Santayana's warning that "[tihose who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it."' In the 1930s, when the
banking laws were revised and the securities laws were
enacted, Congress attempted to deal with the issue of conflicts
of interest. When it came to the securities activities of banks,
Congress confronted the problem head-on. The Glass-Steagall
Act separated commercial banking from investment banking.'
Over the years, that bold, radical step was steadily eroded by
judicial and administrative decisions, and was finally repealed
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.' The question,
however, remains: was Glass-Steagall a costly mistake like
Prohibition, or did Congress get it right the first time?
In September 2003, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the New York Attorney General
charged that Bank of America provided $300 million in credit
to a hedge fund to finance its illegal late trading and market
timing in the bank's own family of mutual funds.' And in
February 2004, the same two regulators accused a former
director of another large bank, CIBC, with facilitating late
trading by the same hedge fund These charges suggest that
GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (2d ed. 1936).
3 Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 20, 48 Stat. 162,
188
2

(separating banks and investment brokers, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377, then repealed
by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999); Glass-Steagall Act § 32, 48 Stat. 162, 194
(proscribing securities transactions on behalf of banks or their officers, codified at 12
U.S.C. § 78, then repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999).
4 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338,
1341
(1999) (repealing 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 78).
5 See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, Attorney General Spitzer and Securities and Exchange Commission File
Charges Against Bank of America Broker (Sept. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sepl6a03.html (last visited October 14,
2004); see also Complaint at 18, New York v. Canary Capital Partners, L.L.C. (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2003) (alleging, inter alia, that Bank of America facilitated defendant's
unlawful trading by making available approximately $300 million in credit), available
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary complaint.pdf (last visited October
14, 2004).
6 See Press Release 2004-12, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges
Former CIBC Managing Director With Fraud for Role in Financing Unlawful Mutual
Fund Trading (Feb. 3, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressI2004-12.htm;
see also Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,
Banker Charged with Late Trading (Feb. 3, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.
ny.us/press/2004/feb/feb03b-04.html.
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the subtle hazards created by allowing banks to underwrite
and advise mutual funds, which the Supreme Court wrote
about thirty years ago in the seminal case of Investment Co.
Institute v. Camp,7 really exist and may not be so subtle after
all.
The first two articles in this issue discuss the impact on
investors and on the securities industry of ending the
separation of commercial banking from the investment banking
and brokerage business, a process that culminated in the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. My colleague, James A. Fanto,
argues that combining commercial and investment banking
creates a risk that is different from the "subtle hazards" that
the Supreme Court envisioned in Camp! Professor Fanto
believes the risk is that investment bankers will participate in
improper transactions of their corporate clients, to the
detriment of shareholders and other constituencies.
Professor Samuel L. Hayes III of the Harvard Business
School presents the view that while investors are better
protected than before Glass-Steagall, regulatory changes are
still needed. Professor Hayes acknowledges that it is not
feasible to dismantle existing regulatory structures and to
build a new system from scratch, but he suggests that in
today's world of financial conglomerates, a functional approach
to regulation would be more appropriate than the present
institution-focused regulatory system.
On the issue of conflicts of interest within the securities
industry, Congress passed the ball (or the buck) to the SEC.
The SEC decided that segregating the functions of broker and
dealer was neither practical nor desirable The 1963 SEC
Special Study facetiously pointed out that, in order completely
to avoid all conflicts of interest, each investor would have to
have his own broker, who would not be permitted to act for any
other customer or for himself. 10 Obviously, this was not done.
Instead, the SEC thought that the conflicts of interest created
by brokerage firms' multiple roles could be regulated.
Regulation, however, failed to protect investors from the
conflicts of interest of research analysts. Despite this failure,
7

401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971).

8

Id.

Segregation of the Functions of Broker and Dealer, Exchange Act Release
No. 739 (June 22, 1936), 1936 SEC LEXIS 263, at *1-2, *8-9.
10 U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
9

MARKETS, H.R. DOc. No. 88-95, pt. 1, at 440 (1963).
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neither the Sarbanes-Oxley Act" nor the global settlement"
requires complete separation of investment banking from
research. As in the past, the preferred solution is to regulate,
not eliminate, the conflicts of interest."
The second two articles in this issue discuss the legal
and economic issues raised by the multiple services offered by
brokerage firms, with particular emphasis on the conflicts of
interest of the research analyst. Professor H. D. Vinod of
Fordham University provides a detailed economic analysis of
these conflicts. He argues that regulation, principally in the
form of a "Chinese Wall" between the various departments and
activities of a securities firm, has not worked, and that
following the Glass-Steagall example of complete divestiture of
brokerage from investment banking would create enormous
difficulties. Instead, Professor Vinod proposes a novel solution:
that penalties for violating fiduciary duties caused by the
conflicts of interest should include divestiture. Thus,
separation of functions would be used as a club to punish "bad
boys."
Barbara Moses, a partner of a prominent New York law
firm that specializes in criminal defense work, provides a legal
perspective on the conflicts of interest of research analysts. Ms.
Moses points out that the conflicts were well known to
regulators - and in fact were described in the press throughout the past decade. As a result, class action plaintiffs
face significant hurdles in getting past the pleading stage in
lawsuits against investment banking firms. In this connection,
she discusses the relevant issues of statute of limitations and
causation, and offers some cautious predictions as to how these
issues may be resolved as the cases move through the courts.
11Sarbanes-Oxley

Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
12 In April 2003, the SEC, National Association of Securities Dealers, New
York Stock Exchange, and several state regulators reached a settlement of enforcement
actions against ten investment banking firms and two research analysts. The
settlement included monetary penalties and structural reforms requiring the firms to
separate their research from their investment banking operations. See Joint Press
Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, New York Attorney General, N. Am. Sec.
Adm'rs. Ass'n, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers, and New York Stock Exch., Ten of Nation's Top
Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between
Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2003-54.htm; see also NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW &
REGULATION § 1.021C] 4] (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004).
13 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 501 (showing regulation without separation
of roles).
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The federal securities laws expressly preserve state
regulation of the securities industry, so long as it does not
conflict with federal law.1" Over the years, state securities
regulators have supplemented the SEC's enforcement efforts.
The North American Securities Administrators Association
(the other NASAA) is a highly regarded organization of state
regulators, whose members have been at the forefront of
investor protection. For example, a few years ago the Idaho
Securities Bureau played a key role in exposing PrudentialBache's fraudulent and unsuitable sale of limited partnership
interests to thousands of investors.'5
Views differ on what is the proper role of the states in
regulating the securities markets. I do not think it is open to
serious dispute, however, that recent investigations and
enforcement actions by state regulators have served the
interests of investors. These actions support the continued
validity of Justice Brandeis's view that one of the "happy
incidents" of our federal system is "that a single courageous
state may . . . serve as a laboratory [for] novel social and
economic experiments . .. ""

On the other hand, requiring national brokerage firms
to comply with fifty different standards of conduct creates
obvious costs and other difficulties. Indeed, one former SEC
chairman is reported to have said in jest that he would like to
have everyone involved in state securities regulation lumped
together in a boat, hauled out to sea, and sunk.7 Although it is
unlikely that this extreme solution to the SEC's problem with
state regulation will be implemented in the foreseeable future,
the proposal does provide insight into the opposition that state
regulators can expect to face, not only from the SEC but also
from Congress.
It is ironic that some of the conservatives who have
traditionally upheld states' rights would today like to abolish
state securities regulation, while liberals have become bornagain states-righters. It should be noted, however, that the
global settlement of the research analyst cases, which
14 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a)

(2000).
15
16

dissenting).

See KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK 192, 355-60 (1995).
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,

The author believes that this statement has been attributed to SEC
Chairman Richard C. Breeden.
17
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represented a joint regulatory effort by the SEC, the states,
and the self-regulatory organizations, shows that regulatory
cooperation, as well as regulatory conflict, is possible.18
The final article discusses a subject of greatly renewed
interest, the respective roles of federal and state regulators in
protecting investors, including the benefits, as well as the
drawbacks, of state regulation of the securities markets.
Professor Jonathan R. Macey of Yale Law School makes two
principal points: first, that regulators utilize opportunities
created by crisis, such as the research analyst scandals, to
increase their own political power; and, second, that the
various governmental responses to crisis reflect the nature of
the competition between federal and state regulators. Professor
Macey predicts that the increased activity by state regulators
will lead to more preemption of state securities law.
The exchange of views reflected in this Symposium is a
valuable addition to a debate whose conclusion is still in doubt.
The three issues considered here - the desirability of allowing
commercial and investment banks to operate under one roof;
how to deal with the conflicts of interest within securities
firms; and the proper role of the states in securities regulation
- need to be resolved with one ultimate goal in mind: how best
to protect investors.

" See Press Release 2002-179, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC, NY
Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic
Agreement To Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).

